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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW
OF THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD:
THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
IN RESOLVING DIVORCE-RELATED
PARENTING DISPUTES
JANA B. SINGER*
I
INTRODUCTION
In his seminal 1975 article, Professor Robert Mnookin analyzed the
emergence and problematic characteristics of the best-interests standard for
1
adjudicating custody disputes. Four years later, in another important article,
Mnookin and coauthor Lewis Kornhauser trained their keen analytic lens on
the process of divorce bargaining and explored “how the rules and procedures
used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs
2
between divorcing couples outside the courtroom.” In this article, I seek to
engage both of Mnookin’s path-breaking articles by examining the close
connection between changes in substantive child-custody doctrine and changes
in custody dispute–resolution processes over the past thirty years.
In part II of the article, I will explore how the widespread adoption of an
unmediated best-interests standard, and the ensuing rejection of the solecustody paradigm, paved the way for the shift from adversarial to
nonadversarial resolution of divorce-related parenting disputes. Just as the
adoption of no-fault divorce facilitated the private ordering of divorce disputes,
so too has the endorsement of postdivorce coparenting as a legal norm helped
mediation and collaboration replace adjudication and adversary negotiation as
the preferred means of resolving custody disputes between divorcing and
separating parents.
In part III of the article, I will reverse the direction of Mnookin’s analytic
lens to examine how the shift from adversarial to nonadversarial dispute
resolution has affected both the substantive legal norms that govern custody
Copyright © 2014 by Jana B. Singer.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Frances King Carey School of Law.
1. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (Summer 1975).
2. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (emphasis in original).
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contests and the role of law and lawyers more generally in the custodydecisionmaking process. I will suggest that the shift from adjudication and
adversary negotiation to mediation and other nonadversary processes has delegalized custody decisionmaking and has diminished the importance of custody
as a legal concept in the context of disputes between parents. The primary
purpose of this analysis will not be to evaluate the desirability of these changes,
but to underscore the close connection between changes in substantive legal
doctrine and changes in dispute-resolution processes.
II
THE INFLUENCE OF SUBSTANCE ON PROCESS: THE SHIFTING SHADOW OF
DIVORCE AND CUSTODY DOCTRINE
In their seminal article on divorce bargaining, Professors Mnookin and
Kornhauser explored the connection between the substantive family-law
doctrines applied by courts and the negotiations and bargaining that occur
outside the courtroom. Indeed, with the shift from fault-based to no-fault
divorce, the authors identified the primary function of divorce law “not as
imposing order from above, but rather as providing a framework within which
divorcing couples can themselves determine their postdissolution rights and
3
responsibilities.” Mnookin and Kornhauser argued convincingly that divorce
law should give spouses wide—albeit not unlimited—authority to create their
own legally enforceable commitments; the authors then developed a bargaining
model designed to predict how different financial and custody rules are likely to
affect negotiations between spouses and their representatives at the time of
divorce.
Although Mnookin and Kornhauser did not dwell on the forms of divorce
bargaining, their argument suggested that changes in divorce doctrine would
also affect the nature and structure of the private ordering in which divorcing
parties are likely to engage. In particular, their analysis predicted that the
elimination of fault as a prerequisite to divorce would significantly undermine
the utility of traditional adversary procedures for resolving divorce-related
conflict—both inside and outside the courtroom. And this is precisely what has
4
occurred. With fault requisites to divorce removed, neither courts nor private
negotiators need to consider whether a spouse has engaged in actionable
behavior, nor to ascertain who is responsible for the breakdown of a marriage—
backward-looking tasks for which the adversary process is arguably well suited.
Instead, the primary role of the legal system at the time of divorce is to
determine the financial and parenting consequences of the marital dissolution.
Thus, a no-fault system encourages both public and private decisionmakers to
focus on the future, rather than the past, and to consider what financial and
3. Id. at 950.
4. See generally Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family: Implications of a
Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Dispute Resolution and the PostDivorce Family].
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parenting arrangements will work for the reconstituted family. For these
essentially forward-looking tasks of family reorganization, adversary
procedures are, at best, unwarranted.
Moreover, the deregulation of intimate relationships that accompanied the
no fault–divorce revolution provided an important impetus for the adoption of
nonadversarial dispute-resolution processes such as mediation and collaborative
law. With the shift from fault to no-fault divorce, the court system largely
abandoned its role as the moral arbiter of marital behavior and ceded to
divorcing couples themselves the authority to determine whether and how to
6
end their union. Unlike formal adjudication, and the lawyer-driven negotiation
that accompanies it, mediation and other nonadversary processes offer
divorcing couples a way to exercise this authority directly and privately, guided
by their own preferences and values. Thus, the shift from fault-based to no-fault
divorce not only shifted the locus of divorce-related decisionmaking from the
courtroom to the conference table, it also affected the nature of the
conversation and disputation that occurred around that table.
A. The Challenge of an Unmediated Best-Interests Standard
Perhaps even more important than the shift from fault to no-fault divorce in
transforming family dispute–resolution processes were two related changes in
child-custody doctrine: (1) the rise of an unmediated best-interests standard for
resolving divorce-related custody disputes, and (2) the displacement of the
prevailing sole-custody regime in favor of a commitment to postdivorce
coparenting. As Mnookin explained in his 1975 Law and Contemporary
Problems article, the history of legal standards governing interparental custody
disputes “reveals a dramatic movement from rules to a highly discretionary
7
principle gradually shorn of narrowing procedural devices.” Although the bestinterests standard predated the demise of fault-based divorce, it was
operationalized during that era through a series of gender and fault-based
presumptions. These included the tender-years doctrine, under which mothers
were preferred over fathers as custodians of young children, and the oftencompeting presumption against awarding custody to a parent who had
8
committed adultery or who was otherwise at fault for ending a marriage. The
rejection of fault and the rise of gender-equality concerns in the 1970s and early
1980s largely eliminated these mediating presumptions. The result was an
unmediated and highly individualized best-interests standard that required a
decisionmaker to determine, in each case, which custody arrangement would

5. See Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute
Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 175 (2002).
6. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1471 (1992)
[hereinafter Singer, The Privatization of Family Law].
7. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 233.
8. Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody:
The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 391 (2008).
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best serve the needs and interests of the particular child or children before it.
As Mnookin’s Law and Contemporary Problems article pointed out, several
aspects of this unmediated best-interests standard are in tension with a
traditional adversary regime. First, unlike most legal questions, “custody
disputes under the best-interests principle require ‘person-oriented,’ not ‘act10
oriented,’ determinations.” Adversary and adjudicative decisionmaking
typically involves the application of act-oriented rules that focus on discrete
events and avoid broad evaluation of a disputant as a social being—for
example, whether specific actions by a defendant constituted negligence or
11
breached an enforceable legal obligation. By contrast, to resolve a custody
dispute under the best-interests standard, a decisionmaker must evaluate the
attitudes, dispositions, and parenting capacities of each parent, as well as the
12
child’s relationships with both caregivers. The process thus “centers on what
13
kind of person each parent is, and what the child is like” —broad personoriented inquiries that are difficult to address in an adversarial context.
Moreover, the most relevant questions about children’s interests and family
dynamics are ones that neither judges nor lawyers—the primary actors in an
14
adversary system—have the expertise to answer.
Second, adjudication and other adversary procedures are primarily designed
to determine past acts and facts, not to predict future events. But applying the
best-interests standard requires an individualized prediction about which
parenting arrangement will be best for a child in the months and years to
15
come. To be sure, courts are required to make predictions about the future in
other contexts, but they are generally able to formulate presumptions or rules
of thumb that make the outcome turn on a showing of ascertainable facts about
the present or the past; the tender-years presumption and the presumption of
unfitness based on adultery are examples of the sorts of mediating
presumptions that were once applied in the custody context. The rejection of
these rules of thumb exacerbates the mismatch between a backward-looking
dispute-resolution regime and a future-oriented best-interests standard.

9. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 740 (1988) (arguing that with the removal of the
tender-years presumption, application of the best-interests standard grew more complex and custody
decisions became more difficult for judges).
10. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251.
11. Id. at 250–51; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV
353, 394–404 (1978).
12. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251.
13. Id.
14. See Elrod & Dale, supra note 8, at 384; Fineman, supra note 9, at 738 (“[T]he best interest test
required judgments and predictions about psychological and social factors that judges were
uncomfortable making.”).
15. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251; see also Francis J. Catania Jr., Accounting to Ourselves for
Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody Disputes, 71 NEB. L. REV.
1228, 1238–39 (1992).
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A third problem with the best-interests standard in the context of an
adjudicative regime is that the accuracy of a decisionmaker’s prediction
depends, in significant part, on the future behavior of both parents, and that
behavior is itself dependent on the parents’ reaction to the decisionmaker’s
16
ruling. For example, a judge may determine a child’s interests would be best
served by awarding primary custody to the mother, with frequent and regular
visitation by the father. But a father who perceives this result as “losing” a
custody contest may decline to visit and gradually withdraw from the child’s life,
thus altering a central assumption on which the best-interests prediction was
17
based.
The shift from an adjudicative to a mediative regime ameliorates many of
these tensions. Indeed, the very qualities that create the mismatch between
adversary procedures and an unmediated best-interests standard play to the
strengths of mediation. First, the person-oriented nature of the best-interests
standard is consistent with mediation’s emphasis on facilitating individualized
solutions based on the participants’ unique needs. Unlike adjudication,
mediation does not favor act-oriented rules that focus on discrete events; rather,
participants are encouraged to view their situation holistically and to consider a
18
range of potential solutions, as opposed to a set of binary choices. Moreover,
mediation’s insistence on the direct participation of disputants—and its
rejection of evidentiary and procedural constraints—enhance the ability of
participants to engage in wide-ranging, person-oriented inquiries. Mediation is
also future-oriented—designed to shift attention away from past acts and
grievances and toward the future-oriented predictions the best-interests inquiry
19
requires. Thus, the predictive and person-oriented aspects of the best-interests
standard, which confound adjudication and adversary negotiation, cohere well
with the core assumptions of mediation.
Moreover, as mediation’s proponents emphasize, parents are better situated
than either judges or lawyers to understand their children’s needs and to
consider a range of options for meeting those needs. Parents are also in a much
better position than outside decisionmakers to predict their future behavior and
that of their children. The fact that mediation actively engages parents in
crafting a postdivorce-parenting arrangement also makes it more likely that
20
parents will shape their future behavior to make the plan work. Thus, the
16. Mnookin, supra note 1, at 251–53.
17. See generally James R. Dudley, Noncustodial Fathers Speak About Their Parental Role, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 410 (1996) (compiling findings on postdivorce mindsets of
noncustodial fathers and the effects of those mindsets); Edward Kruk, Psychological and Structural
Factors Contributing to the Disengagement of Noncustodial Fathers After Divorce, 30 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 81 (1992) (arguing that structural limitations and the fathers’ postdivorce
mindsets lead to disengagement).
18. See Catania, supra note 15, at 1236–38 (discussing binary nature of adjudication).
19. See Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, supra note 6, at 1530–31 (discussing futureoriented nature of mediation).
20. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in
Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 139 (2002).
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aspects of the best-interests standard that render it most problematic from an
adversary and adjudicative perspective evoke the strengths of mediation and
other nonadversary processes.
B. From Sole Custody to Postdivorce Coparenting
The shift from adversary to nonadversary dispute resolution was accelerated
by a second important change in substantive child-custody doctrine: The shift
from a sole-custody regime to a shared-parenting paradigm. Under the solecustody regime that prevailed until the mid-1980s, the job of a custody
decisionmaker was to identify a single, preferred custodian and assign that
parent primary legal rights to the child, with the goal of ensuring stability for
21
the child and minimizing the opportunity for future parental discord. Both
judicial decisionmakers and private divorce negotiators operated within a
similar win–lose structure—a structure that was compatible with the binary
22
nature of adjudication.
Prevailing psychological theory supported this sole-custody model. In
particular, Professors Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, in their influential book,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, asserted that the interests of children
would be best served if courts ensured the continuity of the child’s relationship
23
with one “psychological parent” to whom the child was already attached.
Indeed, the authors placed such importance on the stability of this primary
custodial relationship that they advocated granting the psychological parent the
power to preclude visitation by the other parent, for fear that court-ordered
24
visitation would be emotionally disruptive. Although no jurisdiction took the
policy of stability this far, the authors’ emphasis on a child’s relationship with a
single psychological parent provided an important justification for the solecustody model.
The sole-custody model also cohered with then-prevailing gender roles
within the family—roles that were reflected in the tender-years doctrine that
identified mothers as the preferred custodians for young children upon divorce,
25
unless a mother was at fault for the divorce or was shown to be unfit. This
emphasis on the mother–child bond discouraged some divorcing fathers from
seeking custody at all; when custody disputes did occur, the focus on maternal
fitness turned them into intense adversarial contests, involving claims and
21. See ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 14–15 (2004) [hereinafter SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND
CUSTODY] (describing sole-custody model). The sole-custody model was also consistent with the “clean
break” idea that animated early no fault–divorce regime. Id. at 16.
22. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 977–78 (noting that although a joint-custody rule had
been seriously proposed, no jurisdiction had adopted such a rule).
23. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 38 (1973) (“Children have difficulty in relating positively to, profiting from, and
maintaining the contact with two psychological parents who are not in positive contact with each
other.”).
24. Id. See also SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 20.
25. See Elrod & Dale, supra note 8, at 391.
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counteraccusations of unfitness that would have qualified as grounds for
26
divorce under the fault-based regime.
The legal and social movement for gender equality that began in the 1970s
undermined both the tender-years doctrine and the sole-psychological-parent
27
model. Faced with constitutional and popular challenges to gender-based
classifications, courts and legislatures abandoned reliance on the tender-years
28
doctrine, in favor of a gender-neutral best-interests inquiry. At the same time,
more fathers began to contest custody, often asserting claims based on equal
parenting rights. Family courts were thus faced with a burgeoning caseload just
as they lost the “lodestone doctrine[s]” of fault and maternal preference that
had previously guided custody decisionmaking and limited the number of
29
custody contests. Already uncomfortable making custody determinations,
judges increasingly looked to mental-health professionals (MHPs) for expertise
30
and assistance in resolving the increasing number of contested custody cases.
At the same time, prevailing psychological theory shifted away from
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s emphasis on a single psychological parent, and
toward the view that even young children were capable of forming close
emotional attachments to more than one parent. These new theories coincided
31
with growing research on the importance of fathers in childrens’ lives. This
research fueled an emerging mental-health consensus that children generally do
best if they are able to maintain ongoing relationships with both parents
following divorce or parental separation—a result the prevailing sole-custody
model failed to facilitate. Thus, a custody-decisionmaking regime that was
designed to effectuate the best interests of children was now subject to
widespread critique as failing to serve children’s needs.
The doctrinal response to these developments was the widespread
acceptance of joint custody—a development commentators have described as a
32
“small revolution . . . in child custody law.” The core premise of this revolution
is that, although divorce may terminate the spousal bond, it does not dissolve
26. Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to
Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 402 (2000)
[hereinafter Schepard, Evolving Role].
27. See generally Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 393, 394 (1985).
28. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 235. (“At the present time, maternal-preference standards are
being displaced by a formal insistence on a neutral application of the [best-interests] standard.”).
29. Schepard, Evolving Role, supra note 26, at 402; see Patrick Parkinson, Family Law and the
Indissolubility of Parenthood, 40 FAM. L.Q. 237, 238 n.4 (2002) (discussing sharp increase in custody
filings).
30. For a general discussion of these developments, see Fineman, supra note 9. For a thoughtful
critique of the legal system’s reliance on MHPs in custody cases, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 69.
31. See generally Joan Kelly, Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following
Separation and Divorce, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 237, 242–49 (2005) (discussing research
on the importance of a father in a child’s life).
32. See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 46–48; Elizabeth Scott
& Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 455 (1984).
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the parenting partnership. In popular parlance, “parents are forever.”
Australian family-law scholar Patrick Parkinson recently explained,

As

The history of family law reform in the last twenty years could be said to be the history
of abandonment of the assumption, fundamental to the divorce reform movement of
the early 1970’s, that
divorce could dissolve the family as well as the marriage when
34
there are children.

To be sure, joint physical custody remains controversial, and only a minority of
postdivorce-parenting arrangements involve an equal (or substantially equal)
35
sharing of day-to-day caretaking responsibilities. Joint legal custody, or equally
shared decisionmaking authority, is much more common and has become the
36
norm in many jurisdictions. Moreover, the normative commitment to shared
postdivorce parenting, which underlies the joint-custody revolution, has been
37
widely endorsed by courts and commentators.
The doctrinal shift from a sole-custody to a shared-parenting regime
required a fundamental rethinking of the appropriate procedures for resolving
divorce-related custody disputes. Under a postdivorce-coparenting regime, the
task of the dispute-resolution system is no longer to make a one-time custody
allocation, but rather to supervise the ongoing reorganization of a family. As
Professor Andrew Schepard has written, a custody court in a coparenting
regime
can be analogized to a bankruptcy court supervising the reorganization of a potentially
viable business in current financial distress. The business is raising children and the
parents—the managers of the business—are in conflict about how that task is to be
accomplished. The court’s aim is to get the managers to voluntarily agree on a
parenting plan rather than impose one on them . . . . The court has an ongoing role in
managing parental conflict; parents have continuing access to the settlement processes
if future disputes arise 38or modification of the parenting plan is necessary because of
changed circumstances.

Neither adjudication nor adversary procedures are well suited to
accomplishing these ongoing managerial tasks. Rather, to manage the transition
from spouses to parenting partners, divorcing parents need processes that are

33. See Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 770 (1985).
34. PATRICK PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD 41 (2011).
35. See Scott & Emery, supra note 30, at 80. Scott and Emery report that only a few have statutory
presumptions favoring shared physical parenting, while several others favor joint legal custody but not
equal residential time. Id. at 80 n.62.
36. See Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family, supra note 4, at 365–66.
37. See, e.g., SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 45–48 (discussing
a commitment to shared parenting as the underlying theme of the joint-custody revolution); Karen S.
Adam & Stacey N. Brady, Fifty Years of Judging in Family Law: The Cleavers Have Left the Building,
51 FAM. CT. REV. 28, 31 (2013) (“Over the past two decades, the prevailing custody paradigm in
regards to decision making and parenting-time schedules has shifted from sole custody to
postseparation co-parenting.”); John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Family Lawyering: Past, Present, and
Future, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 20, 21 (2013) (noting that courts today “[n]ormally presume that both parents
will be involved in major decisions about minor children and have continuing contact with them after
divorce.”).
38. Schepard, Evolving Role, supra note 26, at 396.
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forward looking, collaborative, and capacity building. Moreover, because
shared parenting works best when parents are able to cooperate and make
decisions together, divorcing and separating families are best served by disputeresolution processes that diffuse, rather than exacerbate, conflict, and that focus
40
on enhancing parents’ ability to communicate. And if marriage is terminable at
will, but parenthood is “indissoluble,” divorcing families need interventions that
can help them renegotiate boundaries and disentangle their ruptured spousal
41
bond from their ongoing connection as parents.
Family courts across the country have embraced these insights and have
adopted an array of nonadversary mechanisms designed to resolve parenting
42
disputes without resort to adjudication. These mechanisms include not only
court-connected mediation, but also court-affiliated parent-education programs,
parenting coordination for high-conflict families, and early neutral evaluations
43
conducted by MHPs for the purpose of encouraging settlement. An increasing
number of family lawyers have also rejected the adversary paradigm, in favor of
a collaborative-law model under which lawyers pledge at the outset of their
44
representation not to take a client’s case to trial. As two leading reformers
recently stated, “[I]n the last quarter century, the process of resolving legal
family disputes has, both literally and metaphorically, moved from
confrontation toward collaboration and from the courtroom to the conference
45
room.”
These process changes were triggered, in significant part, by the doctrinal
developments described above—the move from fault-based to no-fault divorce,
the rise of an unmediated best-interests standard, and the shift from a solecustody paradigm to a postdivorce-coparenting regime. This progression
suggests that changes in substantive legal doctrine can produce parallel changes
in dispute-resolution processes.

39. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family, supra note 4, at 364; see also Lucy S.
McGough, Protecting Children in Divorce: Lessons From Caroline Norton, 57 ME. L. REV. 13, 29 (2005)
(“[T]he adversarial adjudicatory process is unequal to the task of retrofitting parents for their new roles
as parents living in what will be a binuclear family”).
40. See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 50 (“Conflicted
parents ordered to parent together by joint custody had to have some procedural forum to resolve their
disputes that did not require adversary warfare.”).
41. See generally ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE,
CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATIONS (2nd ed. 2011).
42. Cf. Lande & Mosten, supra note 37, at 21 (“The primary role of family courts has shifted from
adjudication of disputes to proactive management of family law-related problems of individuals subject
to their jurisdiction.”).
43. See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 51–54 (describing “the
continuum of ADR”); Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR: A Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 50
FAM. CT. REV. 377, 379, 382–85 (2012) (discussing “early neutral evaluation” and “parenting
coordination”).
44. See generally PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION (2nd ed. 2008).
45. Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the Family Law Education
Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 513, 516 (2006).
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III
THE INFLUENCE OF PROCESS ON DOCTRINE: THE SUBSTANTIVE
IMPLICATIONS OF NONADVERSARY DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In part II, I examined the extent to which changes in substantive divorce and
custody doctrine fueled changes in the processes used to resolve divorce-related
parenting disputes. In this next part, I reverse the direction of the analytic lens
and ask whether changes in dispute-resolution processes can lead to changes in
substantive legal doctrine. My tentative answer is yes, at least in the context of
custody decisionmaking. In particular, I argue that the shift from adjudication
and adversary negotiation to mediation and collaboration as the preferred
means of resolving divorce-related parenting disputes has led to the “delegalization” of custody decisionmaking—initially by disaggregating the various
components of custody and ultimately by eroding the importance of custody as
an essential legal concept.
This de-legalization process has several aspects. The first is a shift from
judgment to planning; rather than articulating standards for resolving contested
custody cases, a mediative family-law regime focuses on assisting disputants in
crafting
and
implementing
individualized
postseparation-parenting
arrangements. The widespread endorsement of parenting plans as the
centerpiece of custody decisionmaking embodies this shift from judgment to
planning. Second, the shift from adversary to nonadversary procedures reduces
the role of lawyers and legal norms in resolving parenting disputes; this both
reflects and reinforces the view that divorce and parental separation are not
primarily legal events, but rather ongoing social and emotional processes. Third,
the shift from adversarial to mediative dispute resolution disaggregates the
traditional components of child custody and thus erodes the usefulness of
custody as a legal concept in the context of divorce and parental separation.
These changes have both substantive and procedural implications, in the sense
that each affects not only the process by which disputes are resolved, but also
the way those disputes are conceptualized and the questions the family-law
system purports to answer.
A. From Custody Judgments to Parenting Plans
The primary focus of an adjudicative custody regime is to arrive at a
relatively stable determination about the most appropriate custody
arrangement for children following a parental divorce or separation. Even when
a dispute is settled, rather than brought before a judge, the focus is on allocating
custodial rights and obligations in a way that approximates the result a court is
46
likely to reach, according to the governing legal standard. Under a mediative
46. Thus, the formal law in most jurisdictions grants courts the authority (and often the
responsibility) to review a privately negotiated custody agreement to ensure that it serves the child’s
best interests. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 cmt. a (2002) (“The general rule is that courts are not bound by parental
agreements regarding the custody of children, on the grounds that while parents can bargain away their
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regime, by contrast, the overriding goal is not to allocate custody in light of a
governing legal norm, but to help divorcing parents develop and implement an
47
individualized plan to carry out their ongoing parenting responsibilities.
The Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations (Principles) prepared by the American Law Institute (ALI)
embody this shift from judgment to planning. The “cornerstone” of the ALI
approach to children and divorce is the parenting plan, which the ALI’s
Principles identify as “an individualized and customized set of custodial and
48
decisionmaking arrangements for a child whose parents do not live together.”
Divorcing and separating parents who seek judicial intervention (including the
termination of their marital status) must file, either jointly or separately, a
proposed parenting plan that designates the parent with whom a child will
reside on given days of the year and that allocates decisionmaking responsibility
49
for significant matters affecting the child. The parenting plan must also contain
a provision that addresses how the parties will resolve future disputes arising
under the plan; a key purpose of such a provision is to minimize the need for
50
future judicial involvement.
A major objective of the ALI’s parenting-plan requirement is to “focus
greater attention during family breakdown on planning” for children’s future
51
needs. But the emphasis on planning has a substantive as well as a procedural
dimension; it moves parents and other decisionmakers toward a much more
capacious and detailed array of arrangements than traditional notions of
52
custody and visitation envision. In this sense, it begins to disaggregate the
collection of legal rights and responsibilities that have traditionally comprised
the concept of custody. The ALI’s shift from judgment to planning also changes
the nature of the question courts and disputants are being asked to resolve. No
longer is that question, Which, among a predetermined set of custody
outcomes, would be right or best for this family according to some external set
of criteria? Rather the expectation is that the process itself will generate the
options and the disputants will evaluate those options according to their own
interests and values.

own rights, they cannot bargain away those of their children, which the court has an obligation to
protect.”). To be sure, courts rarely exercise this authority, in practice. But its existence underscores the
emphasis on judgment that characterizes a traditional adjudicatory regime.
47. See EMERY, supra note 41, at 103 (noting that many mediators “are less concerned with
terminology than with the details of a ‘parenting plan’”).
48. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7
(2002).
49. Id. § 2.05(1), (5)(a)–(b).
50. Id. § 2.05 cmt. g.
51. Id. at 6; see id. § 2 .02(1)(a).
52. See id. at 7, § 2.05 cmt. a (“The parenting-plan concept presupposes a diverse range of
childrearing arrangements, and rejects any pre-established set of statutory choices about what
arrangements are best for children.”).
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A growing number of states have adopted the parenting-plan framework
53
endorsed by the ALI. Some states now require a parenting plan in every
54
custody case. A number of additional states require a parenting plan when
55
parties seek shared or joint physical custody. Still other states give judges the
56
discretion to require a parenting plan in individual cases. The American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML) has also drafted and endorsed the
use of a model parenting plan. The AAML model plan is designed to “reflect
the spirit of the ALI Principles relating to parenting plans without reference to
the substantive law proposed for making child-custody and visitation
57
decisions.”
Parenting-plan requirements in most jurisdictions are linked to courtconnected processes such as mediation and parenting education—interventions
designed primarily to enhance the capacity of parents to resolve disputes
58
without the involvement of a judge. The primary purposes of parenting
education are to inform parents about the impact of divorce on children,
particularly the detrimental impact of ongoing parental conflict, and to
emphasize the importance of establishing a positive coparenting relationship.
Armed with this knowledge and perspective, parents are referred to courtconnected mediation, the goal of which is to help them develop a concrete
parenting plan that will ensure the continued involvement of both parents in the
children’s postdivorce lives. If parents are able to agree on such a plan, no
formal custody determination is required. Indeed, the ALI Principles make
clear a court should defer to such privately negotiated arrangements, except
when an agreement is involuntary or would be harmful to the child—a much
higher degree of deference than formally exists in most traditional custody
59
regimes.
Although courts and other lawmakers have endorsed the ALI’s parentingplan framework, they have been considerably less receptive to the ALI’s other
major custody innovation—the “approximation standard” for judicial allocation
60
of custodial responsibility when parents cannot agree. This proposed standard
had a twofold purpose; it was designed to (1) provide concrete criteria, based
primarily on past-parenting patterns, to guide judicial decisionmaking when
parents could not agree on a parenting plan, and (2) establish the bargaining
53. See Elrod & Dale, supra note 8, at 401–02.
54. See Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family, supra note 4, at 364.
55. See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 49 (“Almost half the
states specifically provide for parenting plans—some requiring them in every case, some requiring them
when joint custody is ordered, and some requiring them at judicial discretion.”).
56. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.05 cmt. b (2002).
57. Mary Kay Kisthardt, The AAML Model for a Parenting Plan, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 223, 227–28 (2005).
58. See Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family, supra note 4, at 364.
59. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 cmt. a (2002).
60. See id. § 2.08.
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backdrop against which parents and their representatives could seek
61
agreement. The failure of courts and legislatures to adopt this standard (at
least explicitly) has meant divorcing parents continue to negotiate their
parenting arrangements in the shadow of an unmediated best-interests
standard.
Several of the other articles in this issue of Law and Contemporary
Probelms offer explanations for the failure of states to adopt the ALI’s
approximation rule as an alternative to the much-maligned best-interests
62
standard. But the widespread endorsement of mediation as a preferred means
of resolving parenting disputes may offer a complementary explanation. The
rationale for the approximation rule focuses on its advantages in a backward63
looking adjudicative system. But mediation and other nonadversarial
processes largely eschew reliance on the past. Thus, the fact that the
approximation rule anchors parenting negotiations in the parties’ preseparation
patterns, rather than their aspirations about the future, is problematic (rather
than advantageous) from the standpoint of a mediative regime. And although
the approximation rule is directly applicable only when parents are unable to
agree on a parenting plan, Mnookin and Kornhauser teach that legal rules
inevitably affect decisionmaking outside, as well as inside, the courtroom. The
fate of the approximation rule suggests the converse may also be true: The
structure of decisionmaking outside the courtroom affects the content and type
of doctrinal rules judges are directed to apply in contested cases.
Mediation’s forward-looking orientation and its emphasis on planning, as
opposed to judgment, have also shifted the balance between finality and
flexibility in custody decisionmaking. Although custody decisions have always
lacked the finality of other legal determinations, the legal system traditionally
viewed custody as a fixed legal concept. Requests to revisit custody
arrangements were treated as failures of adjudication and were limited by strict
64
modification standards. By contrast, under a parenting-plan regime, parents
are encouraged to anticipate changes in their children’s needs and to revisit and
65
revise their parenting arrangements in light of these anticipated changes. Thus,
most mediated parenting plans include provisions for the resolution of future
parenting disputes; these provisions generally require parties to return to
mediation or other nonadjudicative processes before seeking judicial
intervention. Many plans also provide for periodic review of parenting
66
arrangements, even in the absence of specific disagreements. This emphasis on
61. Id. § 2.08 cmt. a.
62. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody
Decisionmaking, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2014 at 29; Scott & Emery, supra note 30.
63. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 cmt. b (2002).
64. See id. at 3– 4.
65. See id. at 12 (noting that parenting plans treat “future change and disagreement as something
to be anticipated and planned for, rather than as extraordinary and unexpected”).
66. See Kisthardt, supra note 57, at 235 (noting that AAML model parenting plan anticipates
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flexibility and change reinforces the notion of postdivorce parenting as an
67
ongoing planning process, as opposed to a one-time custody allocation.
B. Reducing the Primacy of Law and Lawyers
The shift from adversary to nonadversary processes has also reduced the
primacy of lawyers and legal norms in resolving divorce-related parenting
disputes. Lawyers play a relatively minor role in most family alternative–dispute
68
resolution (ADR) processes, particularly court-connected mediation. In part,
this is because most disputants in today’s family courts are not represented by
69
counsel. Even when parties are represented, many mediators discourage
70
attorneys from participating in mediation sessions. Indeed, some mediators
71
believe legal advocacy has no place in the mediation process.
Even in processes such as collaborative law, in which lawyers play a more
active role, lawyers increasingly share responsibility with MHPs and other
72
nonlegal personnel. In most collaborative-practice models, lawyers work as
part of an interdisciplinary team that includes both MHPs and neutral financial
73
experts. Often, the mental-health members of the collaborative team assume
primary responsibility for helping parents negotiate a parenting plan, while
likely future changes by including an option for automatic review).
67. See PARKINSON, supra note 34, at 199–200 (characterizing as “problematic” the notion of
finality in children’s cases and urging “lawyers, mediators, and courts to make it clear that the process
of decision making is not a process of allocation that is final, but rather is a decision for the time being,
based on the circumstances at that time”).
68. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV.
1317, 1351 (1995) (“Critics and proponents of mediation alike see the absence of lawyers as a defining
aspect of divorce mediation.”).
69. See Amy G. Applegate & Connie J.A. Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty Years
Later It Remains the Elephant in the Room, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 87, 87 (2013) (“[A] survey of individual
states reveals that on average, eighty percent of all family cases involve at least one self-represented
litigant, while in nearly fifty percent of the cases, both litigants proceed on their own.”).
70. Ann L. Milne, Jay Folberg & Peter Salem, The Evolution of Divorce and Family Mediation:
An Overview, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 9
(Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004) (“Attorneys are not usually present during the
mediation session.”).
71. Mark C. Rutherford, Lawyers and Divorce Mediation: Designing the Role of “Outside
Counsel”, 12 MEDIATION Q. 17, 27 (1986) (“For mediation to succeed as a profession and to reach its
highest objectives, advocacy has no place in any part of the process. For outside counsel to advocate a
client’s interest contradicts the very essence of mediation and can produce inequitable results.”). Other
commentators disagree and advocate a more central role for attorneys in mediation. See McEwen,
Rogers & Maiman, supra note 68, at 1351–53.
72. See Janet R. Johnston, Building Multidisciplinary Professional Partnerships with the Court on
Behalf of High-Conflict Divorcing Families and Their Children: Who Needs What Kind of Help?, 22 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 453, 456 (2000) (asserting that collaborative approach “requires new
multi-disciplinary partnerships between the courts and attorneys and mediators and MHPs, in order to
arrive at viable solutions”); Lande & Mosten, supra note 37, at 22 (“As part of the transformation in
dispute processing, family lawyers now operate as part of interdisciplinary professional workgroups
solving family problems in addition to acting as advocates of their clients’ rights and interests.”).
73. See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPPERDINE DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 330–33
(2004) (describing interdisciplinary collaborative practice).
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lawyers work closely with financial professionals to address issues relating to
property and financial support.
In addition to reducing the primacy of lawyers, nonadversary processes also
diminish the importance of legal norms in framing and resolving family
disputes. Indeed, one of the oft-cited advantages of mediation is it allows
divorcing couples to exercise decisionmaking authority unfettered by traditional
74
legal constraints. As two mediation scholars explain,
The ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the parties themselves and they may
fashion a unique solution that will work for them without being governed by
precedent or by concern for the precedent they may set for others. The parents may,
with the help of the mediator, consider a comprehensive mix of their children’s needs,
their interests and whatever else they
deem relevant, regardless of rules of evidence or
75
strict adherence to substantive law.

Mediation also reduces the importance of legal norms by conceptualizing
divorce and parental separation not primarily as legal events, but rather as
ongoing social and emotional processes; thus recharacterized, divorce-related
parenting disputes call not for narrow legal decisionmaking, but for
76
interventions that are holistic, therapeutic and interdisciplinary. Lawyers and
77
legal norms play, at best, a supporting role in such holistic interventions.
C. The Disaggregation of Custody and Its Erosion as a Legal Concept
The shift from an adversary to a mediative perspective has also led to the
disaggregation of the traditional elements of custody and custody’s erosion as
an essential legal concept. This disaggregation began with the separation of
legal from physical custody—a separation characterized by the joint-custody
78
movement. It has continued with the rejection of custody labels, a
development initiated by mediators and other ADR practitioners, and endorsed
79
by proponents of postdivorce coparenting.
The ALI’s Principles reflect both the disaggregation of the traditional
80
elements of custody and the jettisoning of custody labels. Thus, chapter two of
the ALI’s Principles replace the terms “physical custody” and “visitation” with
the more malleable and divisible notion of “custodial responsibility.” Similarly,
the ALI Principles reframe the traditional concept of legal custody as
“decisionmaking responsibility,” a change that is designed “to better connote a

74. See Milne et al., supra note 70, at 8 (“Mediation is bound neither by rules of procedure and
substantive law nor by other assumptions that dominate the adversarial process of the law.”).
75. LENARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE MEDIATION 41
(1990).
76. See Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Post-Divorce Family, supra note 4, at 364.
77. See Robert Tompkins, Parenting Plans: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 286, 290–291 (1995).
78. See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497,
503–05 (1988) (discussing differences between joint legal and joint physical custody).
79. See generally Parkinson, supra note 29.
80. For an early expression of this view, see Tompkins, supra note 77, at 290–91. For an early
critique, see generally Fineman, supra note 9.
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wide range of possible ways decisionmaking authority for a child can be
81
divided.” Significantly, the ALI Principles endorse a presumption in favor of
joint decisionmaking authority even when the parents cannot agree on a
parenting plan, thus emphasizing the separation of decisionmaking authority
82
from other parental responsibilities. More generally, the ALI commentary
explains that the traditional concepts are undesirable because they “represent,
83
and help to perpetuate, an adversarial, win-lose paradigm of divorce.” The
new terminology, by contrast, can “contribute to a broader reconceptualization
of the enterprise from who will possess and control children to what
84
adjustments in family roles will be most appropriate for the child.”
Mediation and parenting planning embody this broader reconceptualization.
Indeed, for many mediators, the refusal to discuss “custody” is a key element of
85
their practice. As a well-known mediation text explains, “Our focus is on
mediating a Parenting Plan, not a custody dispute, and it calls for asking an
86
entirely different question of the parents.” Leading family-court reformers
similarly contrast the concept of custody with the philosophy of parenting plans:
The term “custody” makes parents think in the language of criminal law and property.
It projects a negative image of the role of the visiting parent in the lives of children
after divorce, thus encouraging parental competition and combat. The core idea of the
parenting plan, in contrast, is to help parents plan for their mutual involvement in the
future life of their child by encouraging
them to think in terms of actual parenting
87
tasks, rather than legal labels.

Thus, mediated and collaboratively negotiated parenting plans rarely mention
custody or visitation; instead, they refer to parenting time and decisionmaking
responsibility, terms that apply to both parents. Similarly, the model parenting
plan drafted by the AAML avoids any mention of “custody” or “visitation,”
explaining that this choice of language is intended “to send an important
message to parents about their ongoing responsibility and is more reflective of
88
what actually happens in families.”
Family law–reform efforts in a number of states reflect a similar move away
from custody as a label and as a legal concept. For example, the Florida
legislature recently revised its divorce and paternity statutes to eliminate the
terms “custody,” “custodial parent,” “primary residential parent,”

81. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8
(2002).
82. See id. § 2.09(2).
83. Id. at 7.
84. Id. at 8.
85. See Marilyn S. McKnight & Stephen K. Erickson, The Plan to Separately Parent Children After
Divorce, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION, supra note 70, at 129, 133 (calling for mediators to
“refuse to mediate custody and to instead mediate schedules, housing, even how the clothes would be
exchanged or handled” (emphasis in original)) .
86. Id.
87. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY, supra note 21, at 49.
88. Kisthardt, supra note 57, at 229.
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89

“noncustodial parent,” and “visitation.” In place of those “outdated” legal
terms, Florida family-law statutes now refer simply to “time-sharing” by
90
“parents.” Thus, divorced and separated parents in Florida no longer have
sole, primary, or joint custody of their children; rather, they adhere to a
timesharing schedule contained in a mandatory parenting plan. Similarly, a 2005
“parenting plan” statute in Tennessee replaces all designations of custody and
visitation with terms such as “residential schedule,” “temporary” and
91
“permanent” parenting plans, and “parenting responsibilities.” When parents
cannot agree on a plan, Tennessee courts allocate parenting responsibilities
through a standardized parenting-plan order, developed jointly by
92
representatives of the Tennessee bar and bench.
The elimination of custody designations is more than a semantic change,
although such semantic changes are themselves significant, in light of family
93
law’s important expressive role. The changes also have a substantive
component: They represent the erosion of custody as a legal concept and the
recharacterization of parenting disputes as essentially nonlegal events. This
recharacterization process parallels Lon Fuller’s insight about the relationship
94
between adjudication and rights. In discussing the forms and limits of
adjudication, Fuller resisted the characterization that the proper province of
adjudication is to make an authoritative determination of questions raised by
claims of right or accusations of guilt. Rather, Fuller explained that the
adjudicative process itself shapes our understanding of the claims that are
submitted to it:
It is not so much that adjudicators decide only issues presented by claims of right or
accusations. The point is rather that whatever they decide, or whatever is submitted to
them for decision tends to be converted into a claim of right or an accusation of fault
or guilt. This conversion is effected by the
institutional framework within which both
95
the litigant and the adjudicator function.

The recent history of custody decisionmaking suggests that nonadversarial
dispute-resolution regimes engage in a similar (re)framing process. Just as
adjudicative regimes tend to construct disputed issues as legal events requiring
third-party judgment and an allocation of rights, mediative and managerial
regimes approach those same questions as forward-looking opportunities for
planning and problem solving—preferably by the disputants themselves. Thus,
the shift from an adjudicative to a mediative regime for resolving divorcerelated parenting disputes not only affects the process by which those disputes
are resolved; it also shapes our understanding of what is at stake and the

89. See Alexa Welzien, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Parental Equality: Florida’s New Parenting
Plan Remains Overshadowed by Lingering Gender Bias, 33 NOVA L. REV. 509, 513 (2009).
90. Id.
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-402(2)–(3), (5)–(6) (2010).
92. New Uniform Parenting Plan Adopted, 41 TENN. B.J., July 2005, at 7.
93. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294–95 (1988).
94. Fuller, supra note 11, at 368–71.
95. Id. at 369 (emphasis in original).
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content of the governing norms.
IV
CONCLUSION
Professor Mnookin’s work challenges us to see the connections between
family-law doctrine and family-law dispute-resolution processes. In this article, I
have taken up that challenge by examining the relationship between changes in
child-custody doctrine and changes in the preferred processes for resolving
divorce-related parenting disputes. The examination suggests causal arrows that
run in both directions: Changes in divorce and child-custody doctrine over the
past three decades facilitated the shift from adversarial to nonadversarial family
dispute–resolution processes; those nonadversarial processes, in turn, fueled
further substantive changes that produced a new understanding of
postseparation parenting disputes and that diminished the relevance of legal
norms in resolving those disputes. To return to Mnookin’s original metaphor,
just as divorce and custody bargaining takes place “in the shadow” of
substantive legal doctrine, so too does that substantive doctrine develop and
96
transform “in the shadow” of the prevailing dispute-resolution regime.

96. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 2.

